

Are There Universal Aspects in the Structure and Contents of Human Values?

Shalom H. Schwartz

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

This article presents a theory of potentially universal aspects in the content of human values. Ten types of values are distinguished by their motivational goals. The theory also postulates a structure of relations among the value types, based on the conflicts and compatibilities experienced when pursuing them. This structure permits one to relate systems of value priorities, as an integrated whole, to other variables. A new values instrument, based on the theory and suitable for cross-cultural research, is described. Evidence relevant for assessing the theory, from 97 samples in 44 countries, is summarized. Relations of this approach to Rokeach's work on values and to other theories and research on value dimen-

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Correspondence regarding this article should be addressed to Shalom Schwartz, Department of Psychology, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem 91905, Israel.

sions are discussed. Application of the approach to social issues is exemplified in the domains of politics and intergroup relations.

Introducing his short discussion of cross-cultural differences in values Rokeach (1973, p. 89) stated, "A major criterion employed in the selection of the 36 values to be included in the Value Survey was that they be reasonably comprehensive and universally applicable . . . [but] no claim can yet be made that this is indeed the case. . . ." For Rokeach, the purpose of developing a cross-culturally valid survey was to permit us to "compare any one country's values with those of any other." The research program described here shares this practical purpose, but it also sees in cross-cultural analyses the key to developing a theory of the basic content and structure of human values. The current paper presents the development of such a theory and exemplary applications to social issues.

There is widespread agreement in the literature regarding five features of the conceptual definition of values: A value is a (1) belief (2) pertaining to desirable end states or modes of conduct, that (3) transcends specific situations, (4) guides selection or evaluation of behavior, people, and events, and (5) is ordered by importance relative to other values to form a system of value priorities (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, 1990). These are the formal features that distinguish values from such related concepts as needs and attitudes. They make it possible to conclude that security and independence are values, whereas thirst and a preference for blue ties are not.

These features, however, tell us nothing about the substantive content of values—what different types of values there are. There is an almost infinite number of specific values one could study. There are therefore significant theoretical and practical advantages to identifying a limited set of value types that are recognized in various human groups and used to form priorities. These features are also silent regarding the structure of relationships among different types of values—what values are compatible or are likely to come into conflict with one another. By identifying a structure in the relationships among these types of values, we can advance from studying associations of particular single values with other variables to studying associations with the whole system of values.

A Theory of Value Contents and Structure

A Typology of Basic Value Contents

None of the several theory-based attempts to classify the substantive content of values (e.g., Allport, Vernon, & Lindzey, 1960; Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961; Morris, 1956) enjoys wide acceptance today. Rokeach (1973) suggested an approach that he never elaborated—to classify values according to the societal institutions that specialize in maintaining, enhancing, and transmitting them

(e.g., family values, religious values, political values). He stated that this was one element that guided his selection of values for his survey.

Lacking a theory of value types from which values could be sampled systematically to build a value survey, Rokeach sought comprehensive coverage instead. He did this by reducing the vast number of values mentioned in the literature, in interviews with Michigan samples, and implied by personality-trait words to a smaller set of values that were maximally different conceptually and minimally intercorrelated empirically. Based on empirical analyses of his survey, Rokeach (1973, p. 44) concluded that it is "unlikely that the 36 values can be effectively reduced to some smaller number of factors." Nonetheless, Rokeach did not abandon the idea of value types. He continued to distinguish between personal (e.g., salvation) and social (e.g., world peace) values, and between moral (e.g., honest) and competence (e.g., logical) values.

My work on values began with the effort to resolve the issue of classifying value contents. Somewhat modifying earlier definitions of values, I define *values* as desirable transsituational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in the life of a person or other social entity. Implicit in this definition of values as goals is that (1) they serve the interests of some social entity, (2) they can motivate action—giving it direction and emotional intensity, (3) they function as standards for judging and justifying action, and (4) they are acquired both through socialization to dominant group values and through the unique learning experiences of individuals. Other goal-related constructs such as "personal projects" (Little, 1983) and "life tasks" (Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987) may be seen as expressions of values in specific life domains.

The above characteristics of values do not point to their substantive content. However, implicit in the view of values as goals, and critical for theory development, is the idea that the crucial content aspect that distinguishes among values is the type of motivational goal they express.

A typology of the different contents of values was derived using the following reasoning. In order to cope with reality in a social context, groups and individuals cognitively transform the necessities inherent in human existence and express them in the language of specific values about which they can then communicate. Specifically, values represent, in the form of conscious goals, responses to three universal requirements with which all individuals and societies must cope: needs of individuals as biological organisms, requisites of coordinated social interaction, and requirements for the smooth functioning and survival of groups.

Ten motivationally distinct types of values were derived from these three universal requirements. For example, the motivational type *conformity* was derived from the prerequisite of smooth interaction and group survival, which prescribes that individuals restrain impulses and inhibit actions that might hurt others. And the motivational type *self-direction* was derived from organismic

Table 1. Motivational Types of Values

Definition	Exemplary values	Sources
Power: Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources	Social power authority, wealth	Interaction Group
Achievement: Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards.	Successful capable ambitious	Interaction Group
Hedonism: Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself.	Pleasure Enjoying life	Organism
Stimulation: Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life.	Daring, varied life, exciting life	Organism
Self-direction: Independent thought and action—choosing, creating, exploring.	Creativity, curious Freedom	Organism Interaction
Universalism: Understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of <i>all</i> people and for nature.	Broad-minded, social justice, equality Protecting the environment	Group* Organism
Benevolence: Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact.	Helpful Honest Forgiving	Organism Interaction Group
Tradition: Respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide.	Humble, devout Accepting my portion in life	Group
Conformity: Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms.	Politeness, obedient Honoring parents and elders	Interaction Group
Security: Safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships, and of self.	National security Social order, clean	Organism Interaction Group

Note. Organism: universal needs of individuals as biological organisms; Interaction: universal requirements of coordinated social interaction; Group: universal requirements for smooth functioning and survival of groups.

*Emerges when people come into contact with those outside the extended primary group, recognize intergroup interdependence, and become aware of the scarcity of natural resources.

needs for mastery and from the interaction requirements of autonomy and independence (detailed derivations are found in Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, 1990, and Schwartz, 1992).

The ten value types are listed in the first column of Table 1, each defined in terms of its central goal. The second column lists exemplary specific values that primarily represent each type. When people act in ways that express these specific values or lead to their attainment, they promote the central goal of the value type. Column three lists the universal requirements of human existence from which each value type was derived.

Is this set of ten value types exhaustive of all the main types recognized in different cultures? This question cannot be answered definitively, although some empirical findings reported below bear upon it. One assertion can be made. It is possible to classify virtually all the items found in lists of specific values from

different cultures (Braithwaite & Law, 1985; Chinese Culture Connection, 1987; Hofstede, 1980; Levy & Guttman, 1974; Munro, 1985; Rokeach, 1973) into one of these ten motivational types of values.

Values that represent the goal of finding meaning in life (e.g., meaning in life, a spiritual life, inner harmony) fulfill the definitional requirements to be classified as an eleventh value type. It is arguable, however, whether this type—that I have called *spirituality values*—is derivable from the universal requirements mentioned above (Schwartz, 1992). It may therefore not be recognized implicitly across cultures.

If these are the basic types of human values, there should be evidence that they are discriminated in all cultural groups. If this set is comprehensive, there should be no evidence for additional types in cross-cultural studies. Thus, the investigation of the value types across cultures is crucial to theory building.

The Structure of Value Relations

Several researchers have derived typologies of value contents empirically (e.g., Braithwaite & Law, 1985; Chinese Culture Connection, 1987; Crosby, Bitner & Gill, 1990; Feather & Peay, 1975; Hofstede, 1980; Maloney & Katz, 1976). However, they have not followed Rokeach's intuition that at least some types of values might be interdependent because they stand in opposition to one another (moral vs. competence, personal vs. social). Rather, they have treated the different factors or dimensions of values they identified as independent. Consequently, they have not suggested ways to conceptualize value systems as coherent structures. The second focus of our theory is to specify a set of dynamic relations among the motivational types of values that allows us to relate values to other variables in an integrated manner.

The key to identifying the structure of value relations is the assumption that actions taken in the pursuit of each type of values have psychological, practical, and social consequences that may conflict or may be compatible with the pursuit of other value types. Analyses of the conflicts and compatibilities likely to arise when people pursue these types of values simultaneously yield hypotheses about potentially universal relations among value priorities (Schwartz, 1992).

For example, the pursuit of achievement values may conflict with the pursuit of benevolence values: seeking personal success for oneself is likely to obstruct actions aimed at enhancing the welfare of others who need one's help. In like manner, the pursuit of tradition values conflicts with the pursuit of stimulation values: accepting cultural and religious customs and ideas handed down from the past is likely to inhibit seeking novelty, challenge, and excitement. On the other hand, the pursuit of benevolence and of conformity values is compatible: both entail behaving in a manner approved by one's close group.

The total pattern of relations of conflict and compatibility among value

priorities that is postulated to structure value systems is represented in Fig. 1. Competing value types emanate in opposing directions from the center; compatible types are in close proximity going around the circle. The location of tradition outside of conformity, discussed in Schwartz (1992), implies that these two value types share a single motivational goal—subordination of self in favor of socially imposed expectations.

Although the theory discriminates among value types, it postulates that, at a more basic level, values form a continuum of related motivations. It is this continuum that gives rise to the circular structure. The nature of the continuum is clarified by noting the shared motivational emphases of adjacent value types.

The shared emphases are as follows: (a) power and achievement—both emphasize social superiority and esteem; (b) achievement and hedonism—both focus on self-centered satisfaction; (c) hedonism and stimulation—both entail a desire for affectively pleasant arousal; (d) stimulation and self-direction—both




Fig. 1. Theoretical model of relations among motivational types of values, higher order value types, and bipolar value dimensions (adapted, with permission, from Schwartz, 1992).

involve intrinsic interest in novelty and mastery; (e) self-direction and universalism—both express reliance upon one's own judgment and comfort with the diversity of existence; (f) universalism and benevolence—both are concerned with enhancement of others and transcendence of selfish interests; (g) benevolence and conformity—both call for normative behavior that promotes close relationships; (h) benevolence and tradition—both promote devotion to one's ingroup; (i) conformity and tradition—both entail subordination of self in favor of socially imposed expectations; (j) tradition and security—both stress preserving existing social arrangements that give certainty to life; (k) conformity and security—both emphasize protection of order and harmony in relations; (l) security and power—both stress avoiding or overcoming the threat of uncertainties by controlling relationships and resources.

The partitioning of single values into value types (Fig. 1) represents conceptually convenient decisions about where one fuzzy set ends and another begins in the circular structure. The motivational differences between value types are continuous rather than discrete, with more overlap in meaning near the boundaries of adjacent value types. Consequently, in empirical studies, values from adjacent types may intermix rather than emerge in clearly distinct regions. In contrast, values and value types that express opposing motivations should be discriminated clearly from one another.

The oppositions between competing value types can be summarized by viewing values as organized in two bipolar dimensions. As shown in Fig. 1, one dimension contrasts higher order Openness to Change and Conservation value types. This dimension opposes values emphasizing own independent thought and action and favoring change (self-direction and stimulation) to those emphasizing submissive self-restriction, preservation of traditional practices, and protection of stability (security, conformity, and tradition). The second dimension contrasts higher order Self-Enhancement and Self-Transcendence value types. This dimension opposes values emphasizing acceptance of others as equals and concern for their welfare (universalism and benevolence) to those emphasizing the pursuit of one's own relative success and dominance over others (power and achievement). Hedonism is related both to Openness to Change and to Self-Enhancement.

Overview of Research on the Theory of Value Contents and Structure

The Value Survey

In order to represent each postulated value type, specific values were sampled from among values thought to express the motivational goal that defines that value type (see Schwartz, 1992, for a more detailed description). The number of values included for each type depended on the breadth of the goal and the variety

of different values that express it. Hence, eight universalism values, but only two hedonism values, were sampled. Preference was given to values judged to have a clear motivational goal. However, values judged to express multiple goals were also included, if they were presumed to be very important in many cultures (e.g., self-respect, social recognition). In order to avoid foreclosing the discovery of value types possibly overlooked by our theory, collaborators were encouraged to add values from their cultures that they felt were missing.

Fifty-six values are included in the core survey, 52 to represent the ten postulated value types and 4 to capture a possible spirituality type. The values are presented in two lists, the first 30 phrased as terminal values (nouns), the remaining 26 as instrumental values (adjectives), each followed by a short explanatory phrase. Values from the different motivational types are intermixed throughout the survey. Respondents rate each value on a 9-point importance scale "AS A GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN MY LIFE," from 7 (*of supreme importance*) to 6 (*very important*), to 3 (*important*), to 0 (*not important*), to -1 (*opposed to my values*). Prior to rating the values on each list, respondents choose and rate their most and least important values, thereby anchoring their use of the response scale.

Use of Rating

Rating is used in preference to ranking both for methodological (cf. critiques by Ng et al., 1982, and Rankin & Grube, 1980) and conceptual reasons. Rating has more useful statistical properties (Reynolds & Jolly, 1980). It allows researchers to use longer lists of values and to add alternative values without affecting the ratings of the core values. Rating does not force respondents to discriminate among equally important values or to compare directly values they may experience as incommensurable because one expresses personal, and the other social, goals (e.g., health and social order; Kitwood & Smithers, 1975). Rating also enables us to measure "negative" values—those people wish not to express or promote in their choices and behavior. This is important in cross-cultural work because values viewed as desirable in one culture may be viewed as goals to be rejected in another. Rating, however, raises a problem of scale use that we overcome with an anchoring procedure.

Conceptually, rating may be phenomenologically closer than ranking to the way in which values enter into situations of behavioral choice (Ball-Rokeach & Loges, this issue, disagree). Ranking requires respondents to express sharp, definitive preferences between every pair of values. But people are typically aware only loosely of the possible contradictions between relevant values when making most behavioral choices. The process of weighing and combining value priorities, when applying values, is usually not so precise and self-conscious (Alwin & Krosnick, 1985). People may avoid the sharp juxtaposition of compet-

ing values through selectively perceiving one or another value as more relevant to the issue at hand (Kristiansen & Zanna, this issue) or through other defensive perceptual processes that obviate the need to choose definitively which value is more important. Rating, anchored by first reading through the whole list of values, is probably closer to the “psychologic” of choice (Crosby et al., 1990). It enables people to indicate the importance of each value separately, while keeping loosely in mind the importance of other values.

Samples and Procedures

This article summarizes findings obtained from 97 samples in 44 countries from every inhabited continent, between 1988 and 1993. This includes 41 samples of school teachers of varied subjects (Grades 3–12), 42 samples of university students of mixed majors, 12 occupationally heterogeneous samples of adults, and two samples of adolescents, totalling 25,863 respondents (see Table 2). This diversity poses a strong test of possible universal aspects of value contents and structure. Nonetheless, the test is limited to contemporary literate cultures.

The survey was prepared in decentered English and Hebrew versions. The English version, and versions in cognate languages, if available, were provided to researchers in each country. Local researchers prepared a native language version, which they checked through back-translation, and then sent to me. For all but Greek and Estonian, I then obtained a separate back-translation from a native speaker, and forwarded recommended modifications to local researchers, who made final changes. Up to ten values were added by local researchers in ten countries.

Analyses

The objective of the analyses was to evaluate the match between the observed and the theorized content and structure of value types. This match was assessed by examining two-dimensional spatial representations of the correlations among the 56 single values, produced by Smallest Space Analysis (SSA; Guttman, 1968; also known as Similarity Structure Analysis; Borg & Lingoes, 1987). A separate analysis was done in each of the 97 samples. The SSA is a nonmetric multidimensional scaling technique that simultaneously represents each value as a point in multidimensional space (see Fig. 2, below). The distances between the points reflect the empirical relations among the values. The more similar two values are conceptually, the higher the intercorrelation between their importance ratings, and the more similar their pattern of correlations with all other values. Hence, the more closely they are located in the space.

The meaning of a value is reflected in its pattern of intercorrelations with all

Table 2. Samples from 44 Countries and their Fit to the Ideal Value Structure

Type	<i>N</i>	Moves to fit ideal	Country	Type	<i>N</i>	Moves to fit ideal	Country	Type
T	138	1.5	France	T	159	0.5	Malaysia	T
S	387	1.5		G	360	0.5		S
G	199	0.5	Georgia	T	200	2.5	Mexico	T
A	421	3.0		S	206	2.5		S
S	259	1.0	Germany (E)	T	202	2.0	Nepal	S
T	110	4.0		S	266	3.0	New Zealand	T
T	244	2.5	Germany (W)	T	187	3.0		S
S	154	0.0		S	377	0.5	Poland	T
T	196	2.5	Greece	T	234	0.5		S
S	179	2.0		S	195	0.5	Portugal	T
T	181	6.5	Holland	T	187	0.5		S
T	115	1.5		S	277	0.0	Singapore	T
S	280	0.5		G	240	0.5		S
T	200	1.5	Hong Kong	T	201	2.0	Slovakia	T
T	199	6.0		S	211	2.0	(Rural)	T
T	211	5.0	Hungary	T	141	1.5		S
S	205	5.0		S	166	2.0	Slovenia	T
G	208	4.5	India	S	200	6.5		S
A	1839	4.5	Indonesia	S	263	1.5	Sth Afri (Wh)	G

T	140	4.0	Israel	T	213	2.0	South Korea	S
S	142	4.0		S	199	0.5	Spain	T
T	200	2.0		G	207	0.0		S
T	170	2.5	(Kibbutz)	G	365	3.5	Sweden	S
S	194	3.0	Italy	T	200	0.0	Swtzrlnd (Fr)	S
S	158	0.5	Rome	S	199	0.5	Taiwan	T
T	189	4.5	Rome	S	158	0.5	Turkey	T
T	230	6.0	Japan Hyogo	T	229	1.0	USA Midwest	T
G	259	3.0	Osaka	S	542	0.5	Illinois	S
G	225	5.0	Tokyo	S	279	1.0	Nrthwest	S
T	205	1.5	Hokaido	S	266	1.0	Venezuela	T
S	295	0.0	Osaka	G	207	0.5		S
G	1862	2.0	Jpnese Amer	G	1435	0.0	Zimbabwe	T
S	205	4.0						

S: students; G: general adult; A: adolescent. Unless otherwise indicated, samples are from major urban centers.

other values. Two values with similar meanings (e.g., exciting life, varied life) will be highly intercorrelated and also have similar positive, negative, and near zero correlations with other values. Consequently, they will emerge in close proximity in the SSA projection. Values with dissimilar meanings (e.g., exciting life, detachment) will have opposing patterns of correlations and be located at a substantial distance from one another in the SSA. Hence, the location of a value in the SSA map relative to other values indicates its meaning.

A “configurational verification” approach (Davison, 1983) was used to interpret the SSA. That is, I interpreted the configurations of substantively related points that emerged to form regions, and the arrangement of these regions in the space relative to one another. The presence of the different value types was assessed by examining whether it was possible to partition the points that filled a two-dimensional projection of the space into distinct regions, each of which included the values sampled a priori to represent a value type. The general criterion for deciding that a set of value points formed a bounded region that confirms the presence of a value type was that at least 70% of the values in the region had been judged a priori as potentially expressing the goal of that value type. Detailed criteria are provided in Schwartz (1992, p. 22).

The presence of the structure of oppositions and compatibilities among the value types was assessed by examining whether the regions obtained formed a pattern of oppositions and adjacencies corresponding to the postulated relations among the types. Boundary lines were drawn around the spatial concentrations of values for each value type, avoiding overlap between regions (Lingoes, 1977, 1981). Partition lines were then placed between these boundaries to divide the total space into wedge-like regions emerging from a common origin (cf. Fig. 2). This is the structure expected when some elements in a substantive facet (the value types here) are in conceptual opposition (Levy, 1985; Shye, 1985).

In an effort to avoid overlooking alternative value types and structures, at least two judges examined the spatial configurations for each sample in an exploratory manner. They looked for regions constituted of values that might form meaningful types that were not predicted. For each of the 19 samples in which values had been added to the core 56, a second SSA was run on the full set of values and the locations of the added values examined.

Findings: Contents of the Value Types

Figure 2 presents an SSA based on averaging the results for the first 36 samples from 20 countries that were studied, giving equal weight to each (Schwartz, 1992). This SSA represents only what is common, because averaging reduces cultural uniqueness as well as random noise. It serves to illustrate how the SSA can be used to relate data to theory. However it should be viewed only as a prototype to which findings from unique samples can be compared. In the




Fig. 2. Value structure prototype averaged across 19 Nations (36 samples): two-dimensional smallest space analysis.

average SSA, all ten value types appear in distinctive regions, each includes all the values postulated a priori to express primarily that value type, and the structure of relations among the value types perfectly matches the postulated structure. The location of the tradition region outside the conformity region contradicted an earlier version of the structural theory and led to its modification.

How often did the a priori value types emerge in distinct regions in each of the specific analyses? Most commonly, eight of the ten value types emerged in distinct regions and the remaining two types were intermixed (39% of samples). Second most common was for all ten types to emerge as distinct (29%). When value types did not emerge in distinct regions, what was typically seen instead was an intermixing of single values postulated to be from adjacent regions, as implied by our view of the value types form a motivational continuum. All ten value types emerged either in a distinct region or in a joint region with a type postulated to be adjacent in the ideal structure in 84% of all samples. At least eight value types met this criterion in 98% of all samples.

All the ten value types formed distinct regions in the majority of samples, but some were more frequently distinctive than others. The percent of samples in

which a value type formed a distinct region or, in parentheses, a joint region with its postulated neighbors were as follows: Power 92% (94%), Achievement 94% (96%), Hedonism 79% (94%), Stimulation 70% (99%), Self-Direction 75% (100%), Universalism 74% (100%), Benevolence 63% (100%), Tradition 89% (99%), Conformity 60% (100%), and Security 74% (99%). Schwartz and Sagiv (1995) have found that the intermixing of value types theorized to be adjacent is usually due to random variation rather than to reliable deviation from the prototypical pattern. Hence the best estimate of the presence of the value types across the full set of samples is probably closer to the percentages in the parentheses.

These findings lead to the conclusion that respondents, in the large majority of samples, discriminate all ten value types implicitly when they evaluate the importance of their values. Not infrequently, however, respondents fail to discriminate sharply among value types that share similar motivational concerns, those located in adjacent regions in the value structure.

Distinctive spirituality regions could be discerned in only 42% of the samples, even after we relaxed the criterion for forming a region to require only three of five values (spiritual life, devout, inner harmony, meaning in life, detached). This suggests that spirituality is not a cross-culturally reliable value type. When a spirituality region emerged, it was almost always adjacent to the Tradition and/or Benevolence regions. The ability to reject the reliability of this potential value type on the same empirical grounds that supported the existence of the other ten adds confidence to our conclusions.

In the 19 samples in which local researchers added values, SSAs on the expanded value lists were assessed to seek additional regions that might suggest missing value types. Four values related to good citizenship formed a region between the security and conformity regions for Polish teachers, but were located within the security region for Polish students. All other added values emerged in the region of a value type appropriate to them (e.g., chastity in tradition, clever in achievement). Moreover, the added values did not change the structure of value types.

Another way to assess comprehensiveness of coverage is to look for substantial areas empty of values in the SSA projections on which the motivational types emerge. When the values representing any higher order value type are dropped, and SSAs then run, empty areas regularly appear where the higher order type is missing. This suggests that empty areas would be found were any significant aspects of the motivational continuum of values not sampled. No substantial empty areas were found in the analyses in different samples. These findings for added values and empty areas suggest—though they provide no definitive proof—that no major motivational aspect of values is missing from the theory.

The assessment of value content has, thus far, been at the level of value

Table 3. Empirical Locations of Each Value in Regions of Each Motivational Type (Percents):
Based on SSA Two-Dimensional^a Projections for 97 Samples^b

Power		Equality	76 (10)
Social power	100	A world at peace	75 (7)
Authority	97	Inner harmony	48 (28)
Wealth	95	Benevolence	
Preserving my public image	64 (32)	Helpful	98
Social recognition	62 (36)	Honest	94 (6)
Achievement		Forgiving	88 (8)
Successful	96	Loyal	82 (12)
Capable	87	Responsible	79 (18)
Ambitious	85	True friendship	65 (14)
Influential	76 (21)	A spiritual life	57 (35)
Intelligent	66	Mature love	53 (22)
Self-respect	36 (4)	Meaning in life	42 (33)
Hedonism		Tradition	
Pleasure	98	Devout	96
Enjoying life	97	Accepting portion in life	90 (4)
Stimulation		Humble	81 (16)
Daring	96 (3)	Moderate	76 (22)
A varied life	96 (3)	Respect for tradition	76 (22)
An exciting life	90 (5)	Detachment	48 (15)
Self-direction		Conformity	
Creativity	95 (3)	Politeness	95 (5)
Curious	92 (3)	Honoring parents and elders	93 (6)
Freedom	84 (5)	Obedient	91 (9)
Choosing own goals	81 (4)	Self-discipline	85 (14)
Independent	78 (9)	Security	
Universalism		Clean	87 (8)
Protecting the environment	93 (3)	National security	85 (3)
A world of beauty	93 (4)	Social order	81
Unity with nature	90	Family security	80 (3)
Broad-minded	86 (10)	Reciprocation of favors	75 (9)
Social justice	77 (11)	Healthy	57
Wisdom	77 (13)	Sense of belonging	56 (10)

^aIn the Japan adult and Cyprus, Singapore and Slovak urban teacher samples, the 1×3 projection of the three-dimensional solution was used.

^bPercent in regions adjacent to the primary region are shown in parentheses.

types. It is also important to clarify the extent to which each single value reliably reflects a motivational meaning across samples. Only values found to have similar meanings across cultures should be used when comparing the value priorities of different nations or cultural groups.

The motivational meaning of a value is best inferred from its location relative to the regions for the various value types. Table 3 reports the percent of samples in which each value emerged in the region of its most common value type. Thus, it reveals the most common meaning of each value. Locations in regions adjacent to the most common region are shown in parentheses. When value types formed a joint region, single values were assigned to their a priori

type, if it was part of the joint region. If the a priori type for a value was not part of the joint region, the value was assigned to the alternative type, found in the region, in which it emerged most frequently.

The table reveals that every one of the values emerged most frequently in the region that corresponded to its primary a priori meaning. Of the 56 values, 44 were located in this region in at least 75% of samples, indicating substantial consistency of motivational meaning across cultures. Locations in adjacent regions also attest to similar meanings, especially because about two-thirds of deviations across adjacent regions are apparently due to statistical error (Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995). Including locations in adjacent regions, 47 values demonstrated consistent meanings across at least 83% of samples, most across over 90% of samples. In contrast to these values, whose motivational content can be seen as nearly universal, several others apparently have different meanings that are not even closely related (e.g., self-respect, detachment, healthy; discussed in Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995).

Findings: Structure of Relations Among Value Types

Basic dimensions. In order to assess the fit of the structure of value types in a sample with the theorized structure, the observed organization of regions was compared with the ideal model of Fig. 1. The most basic aspect of the theorized structure is the organization of the four higher order value types into two dimensions: Openness to Change (including self-direction and stimulation) vs. Conservation (tradition, conformity, security) and Self-Enhancement (power, achievement) vs. Self-Transcendence (universalism, benevolence). The first dimension was present in 96 of the 97 samples, the second in 94 of 97. It may therefore be reasonable to conclude that the two abstract dimensions underlying the organization of value systems are very nearly universal.

Value types. The more specific fit of the structural ordering of the ten value types was assessed with a quantitative index developed by Schwartz (1992, pp. 30–31; see there for details). This index counts the number of single inversions of the order of adjacent value types (called “moves”) required to rearrange the observed order to match the ideal structure. If, for example, the hedonism region were located between the stimulation and self-direction regions instead of in its postulated position between stimulation and power, and all other regions were as postulated, one move would be required to match the ideal structure. If tradition were located between security and power, and all else were as postulated, 1.5 moves would be required: one to move tradition past security and 0.5 to place it behind conformity.

Table 2 (above) reports the number of moves required to match the structure observed in each sample to the ideal structure. Ten samples matched the ideal

structure perfectly. The modal number of moves required was 0.5 (19 samples), and the median was 1.7. For all but one sample, the number of moves required to match the theorized structure was significantly fewer than expected for a random ordering (less than 7 moves, $p < .05$). For 88% of the samples, fewer than 5 moves were required ($p < .01$). No alternative structure of value relations provided a comparable overall match.

The extent of structural match did not vary as a function of sample type—teacher, student, or heterogeneous adults. However, the match was somewhat better in samples from European and other Western countries than in samples from the Far East and South America. Nonetheless, there were instances of very close matching in every region. Reasons for these differences are discussed elsewhere (Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995). In sum, most samples showed some deviation from the theorized structure, so the precise ordering of all ten types cannot be seen as universal. However, the theorized structure is a reasonable approximation of the structure of relations among the ten value types in the vast majority of samples.

Terminal vs. instrumental values. Although the survey includes separate lists of terminal and instrumental values, there was no evidence for this distinction in the structure of values. As Schwartz (1992) noted, past structural evidence for this distinction in SSAs probably reflected shifting scale use due to the sequencing or separation of the two lists. This effect is eliminated by the anchoring procedure in the current survey. Factor analyses of the combined lists in the Rokeach survey had also provided little support for the distinction (Bond, 1988; Rokeach, 1973).

Perhaps it is time to question the prevailing assumption that the terminal/instrumental distinction is worth retaining in empirical work. As Rokeach (1973) recognized, people can treat any terminal value as instrumental to another. Moreover, all instrumental values may be conceptualized as terminal. When people rank *helpful* important, for example, this implies that they view the goal of helpfulness as an important end state to foster. Rokeach argued that the content of the two types of values differs; terminal values refer to social and personal concerns, instrumental values to morality and competence. The minimal past support for this claim may reflect the specific items chosen for the two lists, not any inherent properties. The current survey demonstrates that all types of motivational concerns can be expressed in both terminal and instrumental terms.

Instrumental values are “adjectival” (Lovejoy, 1950). Rephrasing them as nouns converts them to terminal (e.g., conversions of Rokeach’s instrumental values to ambition, cleanliness, honesty, obedience). Rephrasing may well change some aspects of value meaning. However, there is evidence that the motivational significance is minimally affected. Weishut (1989) asked 166 Israeli

teachers to rate 89 values, including 16 values phrased both ways. Importance ratings, locations in an SSA, and correlations with background and attitude variables were virtually the same for both phrasings. In part due to the questionable usefulness of the terminal/instrumental distinction, I replaced the “preferred mode of behavior or end-state of existence” in Rokeach’s definition of values with the broad term “goals” in mine.

Comparisons with Independently Derived Structures of Values

How well does the structure of ten value types account for the value factors or dimensions identified in research using alternative methods and conceptualizations? The most rigorous analysis of value dimensions in the Rokeach tradition was a confirmatory factor analysis reported by Crosby et al. (1990). Close parallels can be drawn between my value types and the confirmed models that specify three dimensions of instrumental values and four of terminal values. These parallels are shown in the first two columns of Table 4. Because Crosby et al. did not combine terminal and instrumental values in their analyses, exact parallels could not be expected. But the overlap, despite different theorizing, instruments and analyses, is striking.

Another rigorous study grew out of theories of motivation (Wicker, Lambert, Richardson, & Kahler, 1984). It examined the classes of general goals implicit in large sets of goals. Hierarchical cluster analysis and factor analysis yielded stable clusters and factors that are also covered by my value types. These parallels are shown in the third and fourth columns of Table 4. Parallels with the rigorously derived Braithwaite and Law (1985) factors are not reviewed here, because I drew upon their findings in developing my theory and instrument.

Table 4. Comparisons with Independently Derived Value Structures

Crosby et al. (1990) dimensions	Equivalent Schwartz value types	Wicker et al. clusters and factors	Equivalent Schwartz value types
Virtuousness	Benevolence	Interpersonal concern	Benevolence
Conformity	Conformity	Competitive ambition	Power
Self-direction	Self-direction and achievement	Intellectual orientation	Self-direction and universalism
Security	Security (social aspect)	Balanced success	Achievement
Idealism	Universalism (social concern aspect, e.g., social justice)	Exploration—play	Stimulation
Hedonism	Hedonism and stimulation	Economic status	Hedonism ^a
Self-actualization	Universalism (maturity aspect, e.g., wisdom)		

^aThe Wicker et al. factor refers to hedonism despite its label.

Research on sets of values intended to be comprehensive has not addressed the structure of value conflicts and compatibilities. Consequently, comparisons with the structure of value types are limited to polar dimensions mentioned in other research and theory. The polar dimension of self-direction vs. conformity found in Kohn and Schooler's (1983) cross-cultural studies of parental values for their children is virtually identical to the similarly labeled opposition in the value structure. Bilsky and Schwartz (1994) have shown that Eysenck's (1954) liberalism/conservatism dimension is close to the openness to change vs. conservation dimension of values and his tough/tendermindedness dimension is close to self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence. The essence of Fromm's (1949) humanistic vs. authoritarian conscience typology is captured by the opposition of the adjacent universalism and self-direction regions to the adjacent power, security, and conformity regions.

Applications of the Value Theory to Social Issues

Applications in the Political Domain

Dimensions postulated or identified in studies of politically relevant values can also be located within the framework of the current value structure. First, consider Inglehart's (1977, 1979) materialist vs. postmaterialist value dimension. Materialist values, presumably grounded in experiences of insecurity, emphasize social order and stability and the political and economic arrangements believed to ensure them. They correspond to the adjacent value types of security and power, types with similar psychodynamic underpinnings (Bilsky & Schwartz, 1994). Postmaterialist values emphasize individual freedoms, citizen involvement, equality, and environmental concerns, corresponding to the adjacent universalism and self-direction value types. These two pairs of value types are opposed in the circular value structure (Fig. 1), forming a dimension that captures the essence of Inglehart's dimension.

Rokeach's (1973) "two-value model" proposed that equality and freedom form orthogonal dimensions for contrasting political ideologies. His discussion of these values reveals that equality represents universalism values and freedom represents self-direction values. However, these two value types are adjacent in the value structure, rather than orthogonal. Supporting the value structure rather than Rokeach's view, multiitem scales for equality and freedom, developed to examine the two-value model more reliably, intercorrelated substantially (.43; Mueller, 1974). Also compatible with their adjacent positions, freedom has provided no independent prediction of political orientations beside the prediction by equality, in many studies (summarized in Helkama, Uutela, & Schwartz, 1992).

Recent research has identified four values as discriminators among support-

ers and leaders of different political parties—equality, a world at peace, a world of beauty, and national security (summarized in Braithwaite, this issue). The first three values represent the universalism type, and are associated with liberal or “left” political views. National security is part of the security type, and is associated with conservative or “right” views. Thus, these findings support a political value dimension opposing universalism to security, an opposition found in the circular value structure.

Braithwaite (this issue) provided the most sophisticated recent analysis of the dimensions of political and social values. Because her findings appear both to support and to conflict with my views, I discuss them in some detail. Braithwaite identified two factors, consistent across samples, in analyses of 18 social goals. These goals were rated for their importance as standards for society, rather than as personal values. The first factor, *international harmony and equality*, emphasizes equality of opportunity and outcomes, promoting the welfare of all people, preserving nature, a world of beauty and peace, international cooperation, and citizen involvement. These values precisely express the goals of my universalism value type. The second factor, *national strength and order*, emphasizes national security, order, and power. These values express the social goals of my security value type.

The correlations of these factors with various personal values further support the value structure. The first correlates with additional universalism values (e.g., wisdom, understanding, tolerance) and with self-direction (pursuit of knowledge, self-knowledge and improvement) and benevolence values (helpful, generous, forgiving, considerate). Self-direction and benevolence are the value types adjacent to universalism in the value structure (see Fig. 1). The second correlates with other security values (clean, neat) and with conformity (polite, reliable, refined) and power values (authority, prosperity, social recognition). Power and conformity are adjacent to security in the value structure.

However, contrary to the opposition of universalism and security in the value structure, Braithwaite’s two factors form relatively independent value dimensions rather than a single bipolar dimension. Indeed, her two factors are somewhat positively correlated (.12, .23, .38, in three samples). This raises a problem, because the associated value types are opposed in the value structure. However, empirical findings and statistical considerations lead me to question whether the two approaches are truly contradictory.

Braithwaite (this issue) reported associations of her two dimensions with social attitudes (income redistribution, exporting uranium, crime control), willingness to engage in political protest, and voting behavior. In every instance, the associations for the two dimensions were in opposing directions. This consistent pattern of opposing associations suggests that *international harmony and equality* and *national strength and order* are conceptually opposed rather than indepen-

dent. This pattern is compatible with the opposition between universalism and security in the value structure.

The statistical explanation derives from the fact that individuals show a response tendency to rate values in general as more or less important. This generates positive correlations among most values (e.g., typically above 80% positive among the 56 values in my survey). As a result of the positivity of correlations, factors based on raw value ratings are rarely bipolar. Controlling this response tendency, by standardizing within respondent or partialling out each respondent's mean value rating, reduces intercorrelations and yields bipolar factors. Indexes of universalism and of security values, which represent Braithwaite's two dimensions, for example, show weak positive correlations across samples. Controlling the response tendency, however, yields negative correlations that reflect their conceptual opposition. SSA is invulnerable to this response tendency. Hence, its structures can reveal conceptual oppositions obscured in factor analyses.

Scores on universalism vs. security values are clearly relevant to the study of political orientations and behavior. But the value structure also implies a more comprehensive set of associations between value priorities and political orientations. Two major dimensions of political ideology on which parties in various countries have been demonstrated to differ (Janda, 1980) can be related to the two basic dimensions of the value structure. We label these classical liberalism and economic egalitarianism.

Classical liberalism ideology refers to whether government should devote itself more to guarding and cultivating individual freedoms and civil rights or to protecting the societal status quo by controlling deviance from within or enemies from without. The basic value dimension, openness to change vs. conservation, is relevant to people's stance toward classical liberalism. Associations with self-direction and tradition should be strongest, because the attainment of their core goals is most affected by policy differences on freedom vs. control. The more a party is seen as emphasizing individual freedoms at the expense of protecting the status quo, the more likely are those for whom self-direction values are of great importance and tradition values of little importance to support it. The other conservation value types, conformity and security, should also promote support for parties that favor the status quo, and the other openness types, stimulation and hedonism, should promote support for parties that emphasize freedom.

The circular structure of the value types implies an integrated pattern of associations between values and any outside variable (Schwartz, 1992), such as political orientation. Starting from the most positively associated value type (e.g., self-direction, for classical liberalism), associations should become less positive, moving in both directions around the circle to the least positively associated type (e.g., tradition). This integrated hypothesis received strong sup-

port in a discriminant function analysis of party preferences and value priorities of a representative national sample in Israel (Barnea & Schwartz, 1994).

The second dimension of political ideology, economic egalitarianism, refers to whether government should devote itself more to promoting equality by redistributing resources or to protecting citizens' ability to retain the wealth they generate in order to foster economic growth and efficiency. The basic value dimension, self-transcendence vs. self-enhancement, is relevant to people's stance toward economic egalitarianism. Associations of egalitarian orientations should be most positive with universalism/benevolence and most negative with power, because the attainment of the core goals of these value types is most affected by policy differences on resource distribution. Associations with the other value types should follow from their order around the circular structure, thereby forming a comprehensive, integrated hypothesis.

This hypothesis could not be tested with the Israeli data, because economic egalitarianism is of relatively little importance for discriminating among parties in Israel. We are currently testing it in other countries.

Applications to Intergroup Relations

The role of values in intergroup relations was a topic to which Rokeach devoted much energy. In the tradition of Rokeach's (1960) belief congruence theory of prejudice, the current value theory was used to examine the relation of perceived intergroup value similarity to aggression toward an outgroup (Struch & Schwartz, 1989). Perceived dissimilarity on a set of values sampled to measure the value types mediated the impact of perceived intergroup conflict on aggression. Future research should examine whether there are particular value types whose perceived dissimilarity is especially crucial. This could be the case either because dissimilarity in certain types (e.g., benevolence) is critical for dehumanizing outgroups (cf. Kristiansen & Zanna, this issue), or because certain types are relevant to the bases of conflict between the groups (e.g., power).

Rokeach (1973) related value priorities to readiness for outgroup social contact, in the only explicit study of this topic I have found. Twenty-one of 36 values were significantly associated with an index of readiness for contact and attitudes toward Blacks. Rokeach offered no framework to organize these findings, remarking only that they were consistent with descriptions of prejudiced people. We recently applied the theory of value structures in a study of the readiness of Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs for contact with one another (Sagiv & Schwartz, in press). I limit the discussion here to the readiness of the dominant group (Jews) for contact with the minority (Arabs). Both basic dimensions of values are relevant for predicting readiness for intergroup contact.

The conservation types should correlate negatively with readiness, with tradition most negative. Contact entails exposure to divergent traditions and

customs, threatening those for whom maintenance of own traditions is important. Contact with a culturally different minority places one in situations where familiar norms do not apply, making it difficult to maintain smooth relations and to avoid violating expectations, hence the negative correlation with conformity. Because outgroup members who claim they are discriminated against may be perceived as threatening to disrupt the prevailing social order, we also expect a negative correlation for security values. In contrast, both openness to change value types should correlate positively with readiness. Intergroup contact provides exposure to new and different ways of life and opportunities to learn about and explore them. This is compatible with attaining the goals of self-direction and stimulation values.

Both self-transcendence types should correlate positively with readiness for outgroup contact. The most positive correlation is expected for universalism values because they emphasize understanding, accepting, and showing concern for the welfare of *all* human beings, even those whose ways of life differ from one's own, in sum, goals of tolerance and concern. The correlation for benevolence should be weaker because the concern for others of these values is expressed mainly in everyday relations with close others, not with outgroups. Correlations may be near zero for the self-enhancement value types. Social contact with Arabs is not especially relevant to power and achievement values, in the Israeli context, because the Arab minority has little impact in the occupational and educational arenas where members of the dominant group compete for success, status, and recognition. No correlation is expected for hedonism because outgroup contact is irrelevant to the goals of this value type.

In keeping with the circular structure of value types, these hypotheses also form an integrated whole. The correlations are predicted to peak at universalism and become progressively less positive in both directions around the circle to tradition. Rokeach's (1973) findings appear largely compatible with these hypotheses, when the 21 values are classified into my value types. He found, for example, that equality, world of beauty, and inner harmony (universalism values) correlated positively with readiness for contact, and salvation, obedient, and polite (tradition and conformity values) correlated negatively.

The correlations observed in a sample of 151 Jewish public school teachers, standardized to control scale use in rating values, are listed in counterclockwise order of value types around the circular structure: universalism (.40), self-direction (.32), stimulation (.12), hedonism (.10), achievement (.12), power (.05), security (-.31), tradition (-.41), conformity (-.19), and benevolence (.13). The order of these correlations matches almost perfectly the order of the integrated hypotheses (with only a slight deviation for achievement). Together, the seven value types hypothesized to affect readiness for outgroup social contact (excluding hedonism, achievement, and power) explained a substantial 39% of the variance in the readiness of Israeli Jewish teachers for contact with Arabs.

The systematic nature of these findings illustrates the advantage of a structural theory of value types over an approach that treats values or value factors as independent.

Conclusion

With some modifications, the current theory adopted the conceptualization of values offered by Rokeach (1973) and built on his methodology to measure values. The major innovations of the theory were to derive a comprehensive set of value contents and to specify the dynamic structure of relations among them. These were objectives that Rokeach had set for values research. By assessing the theory in a broad cross-cultural context, I have drawn conclusions about how universal the value contents and structure are, and hence about how basic they are to the nature of the human condition.

The answer to the question of the title—Are there *universal* aspects in the structure and contents of human values?—was foreordained to be negative, if only because of statistical error and the limitations of methodology. Nonetheless, there is support for the near universality of the four higher order value types and of their organization into two dimensions that structure value systems. Moreover, there is considerable evidence that, when they think about the importance of their values, many people, across contemporary societies, implicitly recognize the ten value types and the postulated conflicts and compatibilities among them.

The survey based on the theory is a versatile tool for future values research. One major advantage, mentioned only in passing above, deserves repeating. By combining the single values that express the goal of each value type, reasonably reliable indexes of the priority attributed to the type can be derived (Schmitt, Schwartz, Steyer, & Schmitt, 1993). Using the indexes, rather than single values, greatly improves the likelihood of interpretable findings. The indexes can also insure good cross-cultural equivalence of meanings, if they are constructed from values that emerged in regions of the same value type in a large proportion (say 75%) of the 97 samples.

The research reported here provides the basis for fulfilling Rokeach's aim of validly comparing values in one country with those in others. Such comparisons have been carried out (Schwartz, 1994), but reporting them is beyond the scope of this paper. When values are used to compare cultures, the dimensions formed are different from those discussed here (Schwartz, 1994; cf. Hofstede, 1980). Suffice it to note that the value profiles of nations from Eastern Europe, Western Europe, the Far East, North America, and of nations influenced by Islam show characteristic patterns and each of these patterns differs meaningfully from the others. These value profiles give some support to such well-known dichotomies as individualism/collectivism (Triandis, 1990) and independent/interdependent selves (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), but they also indicate that more complex

dimensions are needed to capture the diversity of culture differences. Profiles from several samples in both Japan and the United States suggest distinctive American and Japanese cultures, for example, but neither culture occupies a polar position on either dichotomy.

I have discussed only a few socially relevant applications of the value theory and survey. Clearly, they can be applied to whatever social issues value researchers address. Moreover, having a theory of the structure of value types facilitates the derivation of an integrated set of hypotheses that relate all value types to the issue in question in a coherent manner. The structural theory also aids in interpreting the plethora of disparate associations with different values. Finally, the cross-cultural validity of the value indexes enables us to address issues from a more comparative perspective. Not only can the value priorities of groups from different nations be compared. More interestingly, relations of value priorities to social policy, individual experience, behavior and attitudes can be examined across societies, in order to discriminate universal processes of mutual influence from processes tied to specific social and cultural circumstances.

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SHALOM SCHWARTZ is Clara & Leon Sznajderman Chair Professor of Psychology at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. He received his Ph.D. in social psychology from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, in 1967. He taught in the Sociology Department at the University of Wisconsin—Madison from 1967 to 1979. His main research has been in the areas of altruism, helping, and attitude/behavior relations. He is currently coordinating a cross-cultural collaborative project on the structure, antecedents, and consequences of human values that is being conducted in more than 45 countries. This project is built on a theory of universals in the structure and content of basic human values.